Towards “militia state”. Evolution of Belarusian authoritarian system after presidential elections in 2020

03.06.2021

 Alyaksandr Lukashenko has won the first presidential elections in a history of independent Belarus in 1994 largely thanks to populistic promises, concerning fair salary and decent jobs, effective measures against corruption in a state administration and timely payment of pensions. Simultaneously during electoral campaign Lukashenko, several times stressed advantages of democratic system and free market economy. Meanwhile, since the first months of Lukashenko’s rule was obvious the fact that all those declarations were very far from reality. As far as social security  - understood as a guarantee of stability of moods in society – became a real component of his strategy of ruling the country, nevertheless the human rights and democratic values were only just empty words. The first president of Belarus very quickly after his inauguration showed tendencies to authoritarian model, what was the result of his mental condition (in the 80’s he was known as a very demanding and also even brutal director of one of the collective farms in eastern Belarus) and well thought-out political strategy.     

Lukashenko at the very beginning of his rule initiated several steps in order to destroy independence of the most important state institutions. First of all he attacked parliamentary opposition, which openly called to protests against “growing” dictatorship. President’s actions  led to violation of fundamental of the Belarusian Constitution. Therefore, in order to provide legal status for “dismantling” the young democracy, in 1996 Lukashenko announced referendum about change of the Basic Law. Rigged - according to expectations of the president - results of voting guaranteed for a years strong “legal basis” of authoritarian rules of Lukashenko and his environment. As a result, the separation of power had been broken and president became the main decision maker, backed up by his administration apparatus, which was endowed with particular competences in comparison to other institutions. The government has got much less position and first of all was responsible for implementation of guidelines, decrees and other decisions from presidential centre. The weakest influence had a parliament, which usually didn’t present too much legislative initiative and it’s work was mainly focused on voting for (not against) all bills, prepared in presidential administration or government. 

Characteristic for Belarusian system of power was the lack of a single and large ruling party or several strong political parties, loyal to the president and supporting him. The weakness of party system was influenced mostly by very specific for Lukashenko’s fear of strengthening of nomenclatura, which, basing on probable strong parties would be able to lobby own interest. Instead of that, he preferred populistic narratives, addressed directly to the citizens. That’s why quite frequently Lukasenko publicly has criticised (sometimes in a very brutal way) incompetent and/or corrupted high-level officials and afterwards part of them where dissmised. In a majority of cases there were well planned propaganda shows, based on well known from the period of feudal Russia scheme: “good Tsar, bad Boyars”.                

The other key element of Belarusian authoritarian system was the very strong position of security sector, including first of all KGB (in Belarus still exists the old one name from time of USRR), Ministry of Domestic Affairs and other services, dealing with counter-intelligence or/and internal security. As a result, Belarusian regime pursued a policy of repressions towards its opponents and other independent groups, which criticised authorities.

At the same time the repressive nature of a state was in specific way limited by several factors. Firstly, within many years, starting from 1994, Lukashenko could relay on his devoted followers, who according to various sociological surveys, conducted in different years, constituted from 30 to even 60 percent of whole society. Such relatively high level of support, which exceeded numbers of supporters of weak and fractured democratic opposition, allowed regime to use not only brutal force but also a positive offer for society. Regime proposed on permanent basis an informal exchange of loyalty for social security, stability and law level of crimes. Secondly, growing from the very beginning of rules in Russia of Vladimir Putin the argument with Kremlin about further integration in a frame of Union State and volume of Russian subsidies, several times has stimulated Minsk to start dialogue with the West, just to counterbalance Moscow’s pressure. Therefore government from time to time decided to present a sign of good will, like for example registration of a single independent NGO or permission to distribution in a state network one of critical towards Lukashenko newspapers. 

In the aftermath of mentioned above factors, Belarusian regime within many years of it’s functioning was a typical authoritarian system, what means a monopoly on ruling the country for Lukashenko and his circle, without significant interference into a private live of the people. Furthermore to some extent was de facto allowed to run a political party, media and NGO, even without legal status of registered subject. As a result, marginalised and being under pressure independent groups of citizens had strongly limited but own space for action, what was very often presented by the regime as an evidence for democracy in Belarus.                            

The end of this (very specific but for a long time quite effective functioning) “balanced” authoritarian system began in Spring 2020, with the rise in dissatisfaction with the regime among the majority of Belarusian society. This has been caused by the government ignoring the threat of the COVID-19 epidemic, which has led to a huge number of infections, as well as the ineffective measures it took to protect people harmed by the deepening recession in the Belarusian economy. This means that the anti-government moods among the public are also driven by the feelings that neither their health nor their social security is secure. Social discontent has been rising since 2017, when there were nationwide protests against the so-called ‘tax on parasitism’, which affected people of working age who had been deprived of legal employment. Dramatic development just before and after presidential elections on August 9 2020 - particularly brutal treatment of opponents and participants of huge protests against rigged results of voting - caused something more than just dissatisfaction – citizens were furious and expected a final of the long term rule of the same president. 

Because of fear of losing power, Lukashenka has come to rely even more on the institutions of force, whose loyalty is now the main factor guaranteeing his continued hold on the presidency. In 2020 and first months 2021, high-ranking officers in the security structures have come to dominate the head of state’s inner circle and increased their influence on shaping Belarus’s policy. This privileged position for the so-called siloviki is primarily due to Lukashenka’s trust in these officers, who are accustomed to carrying out orders, and who believe that supporting the dictatorship will ensure that they maintain their own high material status and impunity. This is particularly important in the context of the brutal actions, which law enforcement forces have taken against the participants in the demonstrations and other rebellious citizens. 

At present, Lukashenka’s narrative is dominated by a tendency, characteristic of the Belarusian security sector, to perceive reality through the prism of internal conspiracies and hostile actions by foreign governments which are allegedly seeking to subjugate Belarus. He has thus adopted a confrontational tone towards both the opposition and Western states, in particular, neighbouring Poland and Lithuania, as well as the US, which is allegedly supporting them. As a result, the dialogue with the West that had been ongoing since 2016 has been broken off. 

In this way, we may say that a “militia state” is being formed in Belarus, which, as it has lost the support of the majority of the population, is now primarily relying on brute force, extensive control, and the persecution of the regime’s critics. Lukashenka’s hostility towards the West and the opposition may also be being stoked by the Russians, something which could also aid the Belarusian security sector in creating a feeling of exterior threat.

The increased role of the institutions of force is being accompanied by the marginalisation of the civilian element in the Belarusian state apparatus. Foreign minister Uladzimir Makei, who had been a person of some influence before the elections, and was perceived as a skilful lobbyist in dialogue with the West, is now just the passive performer of Lukashenka’s confrontational foreign policy. The economic ministries have also lost importance, as they are of no use in combating the demonstrations, while at the same time they are inconvenient because of the overly realistic view of the state of the economy which prevails among them.

It seems that Lukashenka has also lost confidence in some of his officials who, in response to the dramatic events after 9 August, may have lost their taste for repressive behaviour, albeit to an extent which is hard to estimate. One external sign of this was the resignations in Summer/Autumn 2020 of several dozen diplomats and employees of the president’s administration. In many cases, the civilian nomenclature's loyalty is based on the lack of any alternative in terms of employment, as well as fear of the consequences of opposing the official government line. In the longer term, this will cause problems in the day-to-day management of the state, in particular when it comes to pushing through socially unpopular decisions. 

To sum up is worth mention that current model of Belarusian authoritarian system is quite effective for a short term period, as the easiest way to suppress unrest in society and to restore  an order in the country. It seems that so far regime has achieved this goal. The best example is  25th March, The unofficial Freedom Day, when the opposition commemorates the anniversary of the proclamation of the Belarusian People’s Republic in 1918 and which is not recognised by the Belarusian regime. This year the Day was feted without a single large demonstration held by the opponents of Alyaksandr Lukashenka – what is unprecedented fact in whole history of independent Belarus. It is the effect of a huge wave of repression which has been underway for the last few months – hundreds of people have been sentenced to long prison sentences (usually from two to five years) for having participated in demonstrations held in 2020. Similarly, even the smallest manifestations of dissent, such as wearing white and red clothes or hanging illegal symbols in the windows of private flats, have been severely punished. Journalists, social activists and human rights defenders have also been targeted with repression and this has been accompanied by intensive propaganda in the state-owned media. However in long term state based only on force and fear is not able to develop, has no credibility for foreign and even local investors, economy has no source of growth or even to cover all current needs and western sanctions gradually reduce the volume of export as well as import. And last but not least majority of citizens (including part of state apparatus) are not interested in further existence this kind of state, expecting real transformation towards democracy. As a result, nowadays we observe the agony of Lukashenko’s regime, but duration of this process is still an open question.